R&D Tax Incentives--Growth Panacea or Budget Trojan Horse? by Shay, Stephen E. et al.
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Faculty Scholarship
12-31-2016
R&D Tax Incentives--Growth Panacea or Budget
Trojan Horse?
Stephen E. Shay
Harvard Law School, sshay@law.harvard.edu
J. Clifton Fleming Jr.
BYU Law, flemingc@law.byu.edu
Robert J. Peroni
University of Texas School of Law, rperoni@law.utexas.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Taxation-Federal Commons, and the Tax Law Commons
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by
an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Stephen E. Shay, J. Clifton Fleming Jr. & Robert J. Peroni, ?&? ??? ??????????--?????? ??????? ?? ?????? ?????? ??????, 69 Tᴀx L. Rᴇᴠ. 419
(2016).
R&D Tax Incentives:
Growth Panacea or Budget
Trojan Horse?
STEPHEN E. SHAY*
J. CLIFTON FLEMING, JR.**
ROBERT J. PERONI***
I. INTRODUCTION
Research and development (R&D) activity has long held a privi-
leged place in the U.S. income tax system and in economic and tax
policy debates. This is based on three widely accepted understandings
from the economic literature: (1) Technological progress and innova-
tion are important factors in long-term economic growth; (2) knowl-
edge from research activity is foundational in leading to technological
progress and innovation; and (3) the "nonrival" nature of knowledge
derived from research leads to a risk of "market failure" in which the
private returns to investment in R&D will be less than the "social" or
public welfare returns from those investments.' The United States re-
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1 See, e.g., Cong. Budget Office, Federal Support for Research and Development 1
(2007), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/110th-congress-2007-2008/reports/06-18-re-
search.pdf; Staff of Joint Comm. on Tax'n, 114th Cong., JCX-47-15, Economic Growth and
Tax Policy 18 (Comm.Print 2015), https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&
id=4736; Staff of Int'l Monetary Fund, Fiscal Monitor: Acting Now, Acting Together 29, 34
(Apr. 2016), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fmI/2016/01/pdf/fml6Ol.pdf ("Innovation is
a key driver of long-term productivity growth.".... Private R&D undertaken by one firm
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sponds to these understandings with an array of legal, expenditure,
and tax law policies that are intended to promote R&D and innova-
tion activity.2 The tax law responses are a number of tax expenditures
that have substantial revenue costs and raise serious policy issues. 3
The political popularity of supporting R&D tax incentives within
the Washington, D.C. "Beltway" is the tax equivalent of embracing
motherhood and apple pie. Although there have been proposals for
across-the-board cutbacks of tax expenditures, 4 R&D incentives are
unlikely to receive the same treatment. Indeed, legislation adopted at
the end of 2015 made the R&D tax credit permanent at a substantial
net revenue cost (that is, the change was not offset by revenue in-
creases or expenditure reductions). 5 Notwithstanding politicians' talk
may increase productivity in other firms through knowledge spillovers.... These positive
externalities imply that market forces will lead to an under-investment in R&D compared
with the level that is socially efficient." (footnotes omitted)); Asa Hansson & Cecile
Brokelind, Tax Incentives, Tax Expenditures Theories in R&D: The Case of Sweden, 6
World Tax J. 168,175-76 (2014). But see Michael D. Rashkin, The Dysfunctional Research
Credit Hampers Innovation, 131 Tax Notes 1057, 1059-60 (June 6, 2011) (criticizing the
argument that private returns do not capture the full benefit of R&D expenditures).
2 See Staff of Joint Comm. on Tax'n, 112th Cong., JCX-61-12, Background and Present
Law Relating to Manufacturing Activities Within the United States 110 (Comm. Print
2012), https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=4473.
3 See the selected tax expenditure estimates in the Appendix. For a comprehensive in-
troduction to the tax expenditure concept and references to the tax expenditure literature,
see J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Robert J. Peroni, Reinvigorating Tax Expenditure Analysis
and Its International Dimensions, 27 Va. Tax Rev. 437, 439-45 (2008). For the develop-
ment of the concept originally, see Stanley S. Surrey & Paul R. McDaniel, Tax Expendi-
tures 3 (1985); Stanley S. Surrey & Paul R. McDaniel, The Tax Expenditure Concept and
the Budget Reform Act of 1974, 17 B.C. Indus. & Com. L. Rev. 679, 679-81 (1976). This
Article does not engage with the longstanding academic debate regarding the principled or
unprincipled nature of tax expenditure analysis. Application of tax expenditure analysis is,
for policymaking purposes, a fait accompli. The Congressional Budget and Impoundment
Control Act of 1974, §§ 3(3), 308, 2 U.S.C. §§ 622(3), 639(b) (as amended through 2015),
defines the term "tax expenditure" and mandates the preparation of an annual tax expen-
diture budget. Policymakers regularly consult the congressionally mandated tax expendi-
ture budget prepared by Treasury and the tax expenditure analysis prepared by the Staff of
the Joint Committee on Taxation.
4 See, e.g., Martin Feldstein, Daniel Feenberg & Maya MacGuineas, Capping Individual
Tax Expenditure Benefits, 131 Tax Notes 505 (May 2, 2011); The Moment of Truth: Report
of the National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform (2010) http://www.fiscal
commission.gov/news/moment-truth-report-national-commission-fiscal-responsibility-and-
reform.
5 Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-113, § 121, 129
Stat. 2242, 3049-52. The change was estimated to cost $113 billion over the ten-year budget
period from 2016 to 2025. Staff of Joint Comm. on Tax'n, JCX-143-15, Estimated Budget
Effects of Division Q of Amendment #2 to the Senate Amendment to H.R. 2029 (Rules
Committee Print 114-40), The "Protecting Americans From Tax Hikes Act of 2015," at 2
(2015), https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=4860.
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of the need for "fundamental" tax reform,6 the current tax incentives
for R&D have not been subjected to extensive critical examination. 7
The premises for R&D tax incentives are grounded in a theoretical
analysis in which a key variable, new knowledge that leads to innova-
tion and economic growth-"innovative knowledge"-is not well
specified or subjected to rigorous scrutiny. Consequently, the defini-
tion and scope of the market failure intended to be targeted by tax
incentives is poorly defined. Moreover, our understanding of the pro-
cess of innovation and economic growth and its linkage to innovative
knowledge has been evolving. 8 Factors contributing to innovation are
now understood to include, in addition to innovative knowledge, firm-
specific human capital, organizational processes, and knowledge
worker and industrial clustering.9 These factors affect the ability to
achieve welfare spillovers through diffusion of innovative knowledge.
6 White House & U.S. Treasury Dep't, The President's Framework for Business Tax
Reform: An Update 4 (2016), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Docu-
ments/The-Presidents-Framework-for-Business-Tax-Reform-An-Update-04-04-2016.pdf
("The Framework would expand incentives for research and development and clean en-
ergy while also refocusing the manufacturing deduction.").
7 For a sampling of the relevant literature, see Lily Kahng, The Taxation of Intellectual
Capital, 66 Fla. L. Rev. 2229, 2267-77 (2014) (proposing reforms of taxation of intellectual
capital, including capitalization of costs); Xuan-Thao Nguyen & Jeffrey A. Maine, Equity
and Efficiency in Intellectual Property Taxation, 76 Brook. L. Rev. 1, 1-8 (2010) (critically
assessing equity and efficiency of tax rules for patents, copyrights, and trademarks). Kahng
references an extensive literature on the taxation of intangibles, which is an adjacent but
distinct subject from the tax treatment of R&D expenditures. Kahng, supra, at 2232 n.14.
8 See Jason Dedrick & Kenneth L. Kraemer, Who Captures Value from Science-Based
Innovation? The Distribution of Benefits from GMR in the Hard Disk Industry, 44 Res.
Pol'y 1615, 1615 (2015) (noting that "questions remain about the relationship of R&D to
economic performance," including the level of contribution and causality); OECD, Sup-
porting Investment in Knowledge Capital, Growth and Innovation 17 (2013), http://
www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/download/9213021e.pdf ("Today's firms are looking be-
yond research and development (R&D) to drive innovation. They invest in a wider range
of intangible assets, such as data, software, patents, designs, new organisational processes
and firm-specific skills. Together these non-physical assets make up knowledge-based capi-
tal."); Alessandro Modica & Thomas Neubig, Taxation of Knowledge-Based Capital: Non-
R&D Investments, Average Effective Tax Rates, Internal vs. External KBC Development
and Tax Limitations 7-11 (OECD, Taxation Working Paper No. 24,2016), http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/docserver/download/5jm2f6sfz244.pdf (discussing non-R&D knowledge-based
capital and rationales for related tax incentives, and observing that R&D capital itself ac-
counts for only 30% of knowledge-based capital). For a narrative description of the devel-
opment and commercialization of the internet, which is an example of the process by which
a foundational technology developed and became a critical part of the landscape of mar-
kets, see Shane Greenstein, How the Internet Became Commercial: Innovation, Privatiza-
tion, and the Birth of a New Network (2015). This book traces the history of how the
internet transitioned from a new technology to an important tool for research institutions
to a commercial network to the backbone of digital communication. It also illustrates the
varied nature of the contributions of public and private institutions and incentives for de-
velopment by individuals and commercial and non-commercial participants.
9 See, e.g., OECD, note 8, at 7-9; Int'l Monetary Fund, note 1, at 30 ("[I]nnovation... is
a broader process that refers not only to the creation of new and improved products and
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The mistargeting problem is not limited to tax instruments. The prin-
cipal nontax legal incentives to promote innovative knowledge, pat-
ents, copyrights, and trade secrets,10 are the subject of an ongoing
debate as to whether they advance or frustrate innovation. I x
This Article calls for a re-examination of U.S. R&D tax incentives
under a framework that critically examines the scope of tax incentives
and how they fit into an overall U.S. R&D and innovation incentive
regime that marshals government resources to support economic
growth.12 The framework's objective is to (1) determine whether an
R&D tax provision accurately measures income or should be consid-
ered a tax incentive/tax expenditure, (2) evaluate whether and the ex-
tent to which the tax incentive is necessary to address an identified
market failure or other nontax objective, (3) determine whether regu-
latory or direct expenditure alternatives would be more effective to
accomplish the same objective, and (4) if a tax incentive turns out to
be the preferred approach, evaluate design alternatives to make the
R&D tax incentive more cost effective.
We examine certain tax incentive provisions that relate to busi-
nesses' R&D activity: the expensing of certain costs, 1 3 the allocation
of R&D deductions to foreign income,1 4 and the R&D tax credit. 15 In
processes, but also to organizational change, improved marketing concepts, and new busi-
ness models (such as e-commerce or the sharing economy).").
10 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-390 (2012) (patent laws); 17 U.S.C.
§§ 101-1332 (2012) (copyright laws); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-1839 (2012) (criminal laws relating
to the protection of trade secrets).
11 See, e.g., Joseph E. Stiglitz, Intellectual Property Rights, the Pool of Knowledge, and
Innovation 1 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 20014, 2014), http://
www.nber.org/papers/w20014.pdf (stating that "[t]he strength and design of IPR [intellec-
tual property rights] affects the extent to which any innovation adds to or subtracts from
the pool of ideas that are available to be commercially exploited," and that "stronger intel-
lectual property rights may lead to a lower pace of innovation").
12 See, e.g., Hansson & Brokelind, note 1, at 73 (analysis of eighteen European countries
shows that "R&D incentives have no statistically significant impact on economic growth").
13 IRC § 174.
14 Reg. § 1.861-17.
15 IRC § 41. The credit is named the "research and experimentation" credit to track the
same term used in § 174. We use the more colloquial term "research and development."
In addition to being easier to understand, it avoids the misleading suggestion that eligible
expenditures must involve risky experimentation. To prevent a double tax benefit from the
same expenditures, § 280C (c) generally prohibits § 174 deductions for expenses claimed as
credits under § 41(a). Under § 280C (c)(3), however, a taxpayer claiming a deduction may
elect to also claim a reduced credit. The otherwise allowable credit must be reduced by a
percentage equal to the highest corporate tax rate.
This Article does not examine a range of other tax provisions that directly or indirectly
relate to R&D or IP, including § 167(f)(1) (depreciation of computer software),
§ 167(g)(8) (amortization of expenses incurred in connection with certain musical works
and copyrights), § 1221(a)(3) (including in the definition of "capital asset" copyrights, liter-
ary, musical, or artistic compositions, letters or memoranda, and similar property),
§ 1221(b)(3) (special rules relating to the sale or exchange of self-created musical works),
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step one of the framework we conclude that under traditional tax pol-
icy metrics, these provisions are more favorable to taxpayers than is
consistent with an objective of accurately measuring income. Accord-
ingly, they properly are considered tax expenditures. We also demon-
strate how these R&D-specific tax expenditures may be magnified
through interaction with another tax expenditure, the deferral of U.S.
tax on most active foreign income of controlled foreign
corporations.16
For purposes of this discussion, R&D business tax incentives are
assumed at least initially to have as their objective correcting a market
failure of under-investment in innovative knowledge predicted by eco-
nomic theory.17 This assumption highlights an initial problem: It is
difficult to identify research for innovative knowledge that would not
be undertaken by companies without the marginal tax incentive.
Stated conversely, it is often unclear whether an R&D incentive will
cause additional innovation or will simply be wasted on research that
would be conducted even without the tax incentive. This second part
of the analysis puts a premium on identifying with some precision the
R&D subject to market failure (that is, under-investment) that argua-
bly justifies intervention by means of a tax incentive. This is difficult
because there is a gap between the articulation of the economic the-
ory, which does not specify (1) what constitutes innovative knowledge,
and (2) the identification of R&D activity that aims at innovative
knowledge and that would plausibly be conducted by the private sec-
tor, but in which there is private sector under-investment because of
positive spillovers.
Our analysis considers whether the identified business R&D tax in-
centive provisions, alone or in combination with other tax expenditure
provisions, address private under-investment in innovative knowl-
edge, and whether the tax relief is cost-effective in relation to the rev-
enue loss. Under our current state of knowledge, because of the
identification problem described above, we do not have reliable em-
pirical measures of (1) the amount of private under-investment in
R&D aimed at innovative knowledge, (2) the welfare loss from such
§ 1235 (tax treatment of the sale or exchange of patents), § 1249 (tax treatment of the gain
from certain sales or exchanges of patents and other IP to foreign corporations), and
§ 1253 (tax treatment of transfers of franchises, trademarks, and trade names). For a more
comprehensive review of tax provisions affecting IP, see generally Nguyen & Maine, note
7.
16 IRC § 951(a); see notes 82-98 and accompanying text.
17 See, e.g., note 106 and accompanying text. It is possible that R&D tax incentives
correct other market distortions. For example, the availability of R&D incentives may
reduce the propensity for market concentration in sectors with high R&D intensity. We
thank Professor David Hasen for this observation. We do not explore such other possible
effects in this Article.
Imaged with the permission of Tax Law Review of New York University School of LawImaged with the permission of Tax Law Review of New York University School of Law
2016]
TAX LAW REVIEW
under-investment, and (3) the effect of R&D tax incentives on eco-
nomic growth and welfare. 18 We tentatively conclude that a private
market failure of under-investment in innovative knowledge has not
been sufficiently defined or established to warrant application of the
existing R&D tax incentives to address it.
A possible alternative justification for an R&D incentive is to foster
economic growth through "innovation," as distinguished from com-
pensating for under-investment in R&D. 19 However, economic the-
ory fails to provide an operational definition of innovative knowledge
and it does not explain sufficiently how knowledge leads to innovation
that drives economic growth so as to justify innovation incentives di-
rected at R&D. Here, as well, we question whether there is sufficient
understanding of the process that leads from research to development
to commercialization to economic growth to be able to specify an ap-
propriate (and appropriately narrow) target for government interven-
tion that can be achieved with a cost-effective tax incentive. Indeed,
factors distinct from R&D, such as worker training, workplace de-
signs, and firm organizational processes, are now considered to make
a commensurate contribution to innovation.20 In essence, we question
whether an innovation incentive's cost effectiveness can be estab-
lished as superior to the alternative potential public uses of the for-
gone revenues.
The political desire to be perceived as advancing national economic
growth is powerful, as highlighted by proposals for an "innovation
box" (that is, a lower rate on income intended to be produced from
successful R&D, often also referred to as a "patent box") being ag-
gressively advanced by some in the business community under a ratio-
18 This is not to say that there are not estimates in the literature. The IMF reports that
"the private rate of return to business R&D-that is, a firm's extra income from a dollar
invested in R&D-is quite high, typically ranging between 20 and 30 percent .... Domestic
social rates of return to private R&D are generally estimated to be two to three times the
private return." Int'l Monetary Fund, note 1, at 33-34 (citations and emphasis omitted).
These estimates rely on identifying R&D capital, in the first instance, and, under a growth
accounting framework, treating the product of R&D as the residual growth factor in pro-
duction that is not accounted for by the identifiable inputs (such as labor, capital, and
intermediate inputs). Bronwyn H. Hall, Jacques Mairesse & Pierre Mohnen, Measuring
the Returns to R&D, in 2 Handbook of the Economics of Innovation 1035 (Bronwyn H.
Hall & Nathan Rosenberg eds., 2010). This description hints at the measurement chal-
lenges that abound and are acknowledged in the literature. See, e.g., id. at 1073. This
article's understated conclusion captures the point that there is at least confidence in the
sign of the return: "In spite of the revealed complexity of the problem, we have learned
something about the rates of return to R&D. They are positive in many countries and
usually higher than those to ordinary capital. The adjustment costs are also greater than
that to ordinary capital." Id.
19 See, e.g., Rod Falvey, Neil Foster & David Greenaway, Intellectual Property Rights
and Economic Growth, 10 Rev. Dev. Econ. 700, 712 (2006).
20 See, e.g., OECD, note 8, at 17; Modica & Neubig, note 8, at 7-11.
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nale that it is necessary to engage in an intercountry tax competition
for R&D activity.21 Our analysis of the innovation box "output" in-
centive is that it is poorly designed to achieve that end and would be
inferior to public-directed research grants or even a tax credit input
incentive as a mechanism to retain and attract international human
capital talent.22 It is also inferior to a reduction in tax rates as a tax-
based measure to compete for inbound business investment in innova-
tive technologies. The chief attraction of an innovation box is that its
adoption would create the appearance of "doing something" to foster
growth, but spending scarce revenue to create such an appearance is a
poor use of resources.
In evaluating the use of R&D tax incentives to respond to an uncer-
tain amount of private R&D under-investment and uncertain pros-
pects for stimulating economic growth, it is important to also take
account of nontax regulatory responses, such as patent and other in-
tellectual property (IP) protections for R&D, and direct expenditure
responses, such as public funding by the military, the National Science
Foundation (NSF), and the National Institutes of Health (NIH) of
R&D activity. All of these approaches are used in the United States,
but with insufficient policy coordination and prioritization for the use
of resources. 23
In the third step of the framework we use a traditional form of tax
expenditure analysis and consider whether the objectives of an R&D
tax incentive would be achieved more effectively through a regulatory
response or a direct expenditure grant program administered by agen-
cies with the relevant subject matter expertise. Daniel Hemel and
21 See generally, e.g., Am. Action Forum, Patent Boxes, Technological Innovation &
Implications for Corporate Tax Reform (2016), http://www.americanactionforum.org/re-
search/patent-boxes-technological-innovation-implications-for-corporate-tax-reform/; Pe-
ter Merrill, James R. Shanahan, Jr., Josd Elfas Tom6 G6mez, Guillaume Glon, Paul
Grocott, Auke Lamers, Diarmuid Macdougall, Alina Macovei, Rdmi Montredon, Thierry
Vanwelkenhuyzen, Alexandru Cernat, Stephen Merriman, Rachel Moore, Gregg Muresan,
Pieter Van Den Berghe & Andrea Linczer, Is It Time for the United States to Consider the
Patent Box?, 134 Tax Notes 1665 (Mar. 26, 2012).
22 See notes 171-72, and accompanying text. Input tax incentives are given in connec-
tion with the expenditure side of the R&D process; output tax incentives provide preferen-
tial treatment to income from qualifying R&D assets or activity. Robert J. Danon, General
Report: Tax Incentives on Research and Development, 100A Cahiers de Droit Fiscal Int'l
19 (2015).
23 See Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the Patents-Prizes Debate,
92 Tex. L. Rev. 303, 326-67 (2013) (providing a framework for comparing tax and nontax
innovation incentives based on different criteria, including whether the incentive is govern-
ment- or privately-set, is an ex ante or ex post reward, and cost incidence is on the user or
involves cross-subsidization). Within the ambit of tax expenditures, David Schizer also
surveys different properties of a variety of mechanisms, such as floors, caps, and phase-
outs, to limit or target a tax incentive. David Schizer, Limiting Tax Expenditures, 68 Tax L.
Rev. 275 (2015).
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Lisa Ouellette usefully point out that different instruments can
achieve similar objectives by adjusting design features.2 4 Following
their framework, we argue that weaknesses in specifying the objective
for an innovation incentive should bias the choice of instrument away
from an open-ended privately set incentive that principally benefits
product development and toward an individualized government-set
incentive incorporating peer review and a budget constraint that is
directed at basic R&D and R&D subject to experimental risk. While
the features of peer review and a budget constraint can be incorpo-
rated into a tax incentive, it may be more cost-effective to use long-
established grant procedures of independent agencies such as NSF
and NIH and public expenditure funding.
A clear recommendation for further analysis is whether R&D tax
incentives are cost effective generally or whether, like in Germany,
resources should be directed to support human capital development
more broadly, including investment in education, and funding for uni-
versity, nonprofit, and government research (with public disclosure of
research results).25 If R&D tax incentives are to be retained, analysis
should be undertaken to determine whether design improvements in-
crease their efficiency. Based on our analysis an initial list of potential
improvements should include:
" Narrowing the R&D eligibility for tax benefits to speculative
R&D for which private sector knowledge is superior to that held
in governments and universities.
* Limiting tax incentives to U.S.-performed R&D.
* Targeting the tax benefit to small- and medium-sized enterprises
that otherwise would have difficulty financing risky R&D.
* Using credits instead of deductions, including possibly refundable
credits for small- and medium-size enterprises.
II. U.S. INCoME TAXATION OF R&D
A. R&D Expenditure
Classifying activity as R&D is a more difficult question than ap-
pears at first blush. The largest component of R&D expenditure is
wages and benefits. 26 But whose wages contribute to the creation of
innovative knowledge? 27 Is it only the scientist or inventor or re-
24 Hemel & Ouellette, note 23, at 307-09.
25 See, e.g., OECD, Higher Education in Regional and City Development: Berlin, Ger-
many 14 (2010), https://www.oecd.org/edu/imhe/46006840.pdf.
26 See notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
27 The wages to be included in costs eligible for the research credit are a source of dis-
pute, particularly in relation to what constitutes direct supervision or support of qualified
Imaged with the permission of Tax Law Review of New York University School of Law
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searcher? Recent work on innovation would support a broader
reach.28 Is it helpful to think about what income R&D produces?
The output from R&D expenditures often is unclear.
The output from R&D arguably is a return to intellectual capital, 29
sometimes manifest in legally protected IP or other property or rights
developed as a result of successful R&D activity. But often this return
is embedded in income from the sale of non-IP property, goods, or
services that incorporate a right to or benefits from an intangible de-
rived from R&D.30 It also is possible that multiple IP legal regimes
protect the same product (for example, a software program may be
protected by both a copyright and a patent).31 Not all successful R&D
results in separately identifiable property, and determining whether
an expenditure that arguably improves an existing consumer or inter-
mediate product may be classified as R&D (even under the expansive
U.S. definition of R&D described below32) is a daunting line-drawing
exercise.
A second reason why R&D output is difficult to identify is the time
lag between R&D activity and a determination whether it results in a
property right, product, or service with a positive return. This time lag
can make identification of a return difficult in concept and in practice
and bedevils efforts to establish reliable metrics for when R&D is suc-
cessful.33 Moreover, an R&D expenditure that initially is "unsuccess-
ful," whether in terms of the research objective or commercially, may
nonetheless result in an advance in innovative knowledge. This
knowledge may or may not later be used in projects that yield ad-
vances in other knowledge, processes, or practical applications and
even commercial success.
In addition to the difficulty of assigning R&D income to particular
property and the problem of dealing with "unsuccessful" R&D, there
research activities. See U.S. Gov't Accountability Off., GAO-10-136, The Research Tax
Credit's Design and Administration Can Be Improved 28-29 (2009), http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d10136.pdf.
28 Noninnovative property accounts for over 45% of knowledge-based capital. Modica
& Neubig, note 8, at 8; see also David P. Lepak, Ken G. Smith & M. Susan Taylor, Value
Creation and Value Capture: A Multilevel Perspective, 32 Acad. Mgmt. Rev. 180, 180-81
(2007).
29 See generally Cong. Budget Office, note 1, at 15-16.
30 See Stephen E. Shay, J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Robert J. Peroni, Designing a 21st
Century Corporate Tax-An Advance U.S. Minimum Tax on Foreign Income and Other
Measures to Protect the Base, 17 Fla. Tax Rev. 669, 695-96 (2015) (observing that income
categorization permits bundling of returns to IP with returns from sales of goods).
31 See Nguyen & Maine, note 7, at 51-59 (discussing the bundling of IP rights).
32 See notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
33 The problem of lag from expenditure to innovation and from innovation to commer-
cialization also is recognized as a measurement problem in economic modeling. See Hall
et al., note 18, at 1048 ("Often only contemporaneous [R&D] stocks are used in estima-
tion, because of the shortness of available time-series of R&D expenditures.").
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is a third reason why R&D returns are difficult to identify. An R&D
expenditure is largely for the cost of labor. Historically, only 10% to
13% of business expenditure for R&D internationally was for plant
and equipment.34 The largest portion of research expenses for the
U.S. R&D tax credit is for services (between 65% for the 2012 regular
R&D credit and 71% for the alternative credit).35
It is often assumed that R&D expands knowledge, but we do not
know when new knowledge contributes to innovation, nor do we
know the mechanism that transforms innovation into economic
growth.36 Even if R&D encompasses all additions to knowledge, and
even if R&D overwhelmingly consists of expenditures on labor, it is
very difficult to determine when labor should be classified as R&D.
For example, is R&D limited to scientists or should it include the
workers who support them and those who directly and indirectly su-
pervise? Do they also contribute to the transformation of new knowl-
edge into innovation? 37 In short, designing an R&D tax incentive that
is broad enough to encompass all input expenditures that contribute
to innovative knowledge but that avoids the wastefulness of over-
breadth is a daunting problem. This demands the disaggregation of
R&D expenses into relevant subcategories of basic, experimental, and
applied research that also satisfy standards of novelty and experimen-
tal risk. This is very difficult to accomplish, particularly with respect
to R&D that relates to intangibles embedded in intermediate goods
and processes. 38
34 Bronwyn Hall & John Van Reenen, How Effective Are Fiscal Incentives for R&D?
A Review of the Evidence, 29 Res. Pol'y 449, 450 (2000). In 2013, U.S. gross domestic
expenditure on R&D was 2.79% of GDP. OECD, Science, Technology and Industry Out-
look 444 (2014), http://www.oecd.org/sti/oecd-science-technology-and-industry-outlook-19
991428.htm.
35 See Internal Revenue Serv., Table 1: Corporations Claiming a Credit for Increasing
Research Activities on Form 6765 (Selected Items, by Sectors, Tax Year 2012), SOI Tax
Stats-Corporation Research Credit (last updated Mar. 12, 2015), https://www.irs.gov/pub/
irs-soi/12coOlrsrchcr.xls; see also Eurry Kim, The Credit for Increasing Research Activi-
ties: Statistics from Tax Years 2004-2005, 2008 Statistics of Income Bull. (Publ'n 1136) 182,
187, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/04-05crreac.pdf. The 2012 amounts paid for qualified
services are 65% of the qualified research expenses for the regular credit (line 5 divided by
line 9 of Form 6765) and 71% of the qualified research expenses for the alternative credit
(line 24 divided by line 28 of Form 6765).
36 See the discussion of innovation in the text accompanying notes 133-35.
37 See, e.g., Gov't Accountability Off., note 27, at 28-29.
38 See Hansson & Brokelind, note 1 at 186 ("The reason for stimulating R&D is that too
little R&D is produced by private enterprises because their private return is lower than the
social return .... Ideally, the incentive should bridge this gap .... Unfortunately, it is hard, if
not impossible, to evaluate the effect an incentive has on the gap between social and pri-
vate returns."); see also Harry Grubert & Rosanne Altshuler, Fixing the System: An Anal-
ysis of Alternative Proposals for the Reform of International Tax, 66 Nat'l Tax J. 671, 706
(2013) (generally describing the difficulties of disaggregation that are presented by in-
tangibles); see also Lawrence Lokken, The Sources of Income from International Uses and
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When U.S. policymakers talk about increasing innovation they
often are talking about granting tax incentives. 39 The benefit of R&D
incentives is a lower effective tax rate, at least for taxpayers that can
take advantage of the tax benefit. It is impossible, however, to make a
precise determination of whether the lower tax rate is confined to in-
come that in fact derives directly or indirectly from R&D inputs, be-
cause little effort is made to limit the R&D incentives to R&D-
originated returns (even assuming that such returns can be identified).
It is difficult to closely identify the relationship between an input
R&D tax benefit, such as the § 174 deduction or the §41 research
credit, and the income ultimately attributable to the expenditure that
receives the benefit. It also is especially problematic to design a bene-
fit that targets effectively income that is an output of R&D, such as
required for a patent or innovation box. 40 In sum, it often is difficult
to actually identify which expenditures are for "R&D" (however de-
fined), and what portion of an economic return is attributable to R&D
as distinct from other inputs. Nevertheless, patent box proposals rou-
tinely rely on favorable treatment of a residual return, after returns to
all other factors, as a proxy for income attributable to intangibles. 41
This amounts to a de facto tax rate cut for all benefitted firms with
excess returns regardless of the extent to which the returns result from
R&D.
To date, the United States has largely limited its explicit R&D tax
incentives to incentives for expenditures on R&D inputs. As de-
scribed below, 42 however, the interaction of intangible development
with deferral under the U.S. international tax system is similar in ef-
fect to an output incentive that, while not targeted at intangible in-
come, may disproportionately benefit intangible income. This
deferral-linked incentive is, however, even less targeted at innovative
knowledge than an innovation box.
Dispositions of Intellectual Property, 36 Tax L. Rev. 233, 242-43 (1981); Susan C. Morse,
Revisiting Global Formulary Apportionment, 29 Va. Tax Rev. 593, 623-24 (2010); Wolf-
gang Sch~n, International Tax Coordination for a Second-Best World (Part II), World Tax
J., Feb. 2010, at 65, 91-93.
39 White House, note 6, at 21; Kat Lucero, Lawmaker Continues Push for U.S. Innova-
tion Box Proposal, 82 Tax Notes Int'l 770 (May 23, 2016) (Representative Boustany contin-
ues to press for lower taxes on profits tied to U.S. patents and intellectual property through
innovation box proposal).
40 The scope of the income benefitted in patent box regimes testifies to the problem.
See generally Danon, note 22, at 37-42. Some parts of the U.S. business community have
promoted proposals for a lower tax rate for patent box (or innovation box) income. See,
e.g., Merrill et al., note 21, at 1665-66.
41 See id. at 1671.
42 See Subsection I.C.1.
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B. U.S. R&D Tax Incentives
1. Deduction for R&D expenditures
Generally, for U.S. tax purposes, business expenditures associated
with creating or improving an asset with a useful life that extends be-
yond a year are capitalized and taken into account under the deprecia-
tion or amortization rules.43  "[R]esearch or experimental
expenditures .. incurred .. in connection with [a] trade or business,"
however, may be deducted in the year incurred.44 These R&D deduc-
tions are not recaptured if a resulting technology is sold.45
Alternatively, taxpayers may use a so-called deferred expense
method to capitalize and recover ratably over sixty months or longer
research expenditures incurred in a trade or business that (1) are
chargeable to a capital account (but not for depreciable property or
property subject to depletion), and (2) do not give rise to property
that has a determinable useful life.46 Under the deferred expense
method, amortization begins in "the month in which the taxpayer first
realizes benefits from the expenditures. '47
In addition, § 59(e) allows taxpayers to elect to amortize their re-
search expenditures over a period of ten years.48 This election can be
more favorable than the deferred expense method under § 174(b) for
taxpayers who want to extend the period of recovery. This is so be-
cause the § 59(e) recovery period, which begins when the expendi-
tures are incurred rather than when the benefits of the expenditure
are first obtained, is ten years rather than five years.49
43 IRC §§ 167, 168, 197, 263; Reg. § 1.263(a)-4(b), (f).
44 IRC § 174(a); see also Snow v. Commissioner, 416 U.S. 500, 504 (1974) (interpreting
§ 174 as extending broadly to research expenditures incurred with an intent to make a
profit, regardless of actual realization).
45 Rev. Rul. 85-186, 1985-2 C.B. 84, revoking Rev. Rul. 72-528, 1972-2 C.B. 481 (requir-
ing recapture). The deduction for R&D expenses under § 174 in certain circumstances is
an alternative minimum tax (AMT) preference item for individuals but not for corpora-
tions. Individuals who own pass-through business entities and do not materially participate
in the business must capitalize and amortize § 174 R&D costs over ten years when calculat-
ing AMT liability. IRC § 56(b)(2)(A)(ii).
46 IRC § 174(b). For details of the deferred expense method, see Kendall B. Fox, Jim
Bowers, James R. Shanahan & Joseph F. Maselli, Research and Development Expendi-
tures, 556-2d Tax Mgmt. Portfolio (BNA) § V.C. (2016). While the need for the election
has decreased with the extension of the net operating loss carryover period, taxpayers
nonetheless may choose this alternative for a variety of reasons and presumably do so
when they believe it is advantageous for tax purposes.
47 Reg. § 1.174-4(a)(3).
48 IRC §§ 59(e), 174(f)(2). The § 59(e) election is available to corporations even though
the § 174 expense has not been a corporate AMT preference item since 1986.
49 For taxpayers with foreign operations and domestic net operating losses, which gener-
ally are large corporate taxpayers, the longer amortization period allowed under § 59(e)
may be favorable because it can mitigate the buildup of an overall foreign loss and/or
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The expenditures covered by § 174 include R&D costs incurred by
the taxpayer directly and by a service provider performing R&D on
behalf of the taxpayer.50 R&D expenditures may be deducted only to
the extent that the amount is reasonable under the circumstances.5 1
To the extent an R&D expenditure is allowed as a deduction in ad-
vance of when it otherwise could be taken into account under normal
tax accounting capitalization standards, it is classified as a tax expendi-
ture.52 The Joint Committee estimate of the tax expenditure amount
from § 174 is $28.3 billion over the five-year period of fiscal years 2015
through 2019.53
The § 174 term "research or experimental expenditures" is gener-
ally defined in the regulations to mean expenditures that represent
research and development costs in the experimental or laboratory
sense.54 This often-quoted language potentially misleads regarding
the scope of expenditures that come within the § 174 expensing rule.
The regulations provide: "Expenditures represent research and devel-
opment costs in the experimental or laboratory sense if they are for
activities intended to discover information that would eliminate un-
certainty concerning the development or improvement of a
product. 55
Another signal feature of the § 174 expensing rule is that it is not
limited to R&D performed in the United States. Accordingly, R&D
performed through a foreign branch or by a foreign service provider is
eligible for expensing.
To accommodate pressures along various margins from industry,
Treasury and the IRS have indirectly expanded the definition of
R&D. As one example cited by commentators, changes to the regula-
tions' application of the "uncertainty" test were promulgated so that
otherwise increase a foreign tax credit limitation as a result of a reduced allocation of R&D
to foreign income.
50 Reg. § 1.174-2(a)(10).
51 IRC § 174(e).
52 See Staff of Joint Comm. on Tax'n, 114th Cong., JCX-141R-15, Estimates of Federal
Tax Expenditures for Fiscal Years 2015-2019, at 6 (Comm. Print 2015).
53 See id. at 29 tbl.1. The Joint Committee estimate of the amount of a tax expenditure
is a static estimate of tax that would be paid if the provision were not in place and the
taxpayer used the best available alternative tax treatment of the item. Id. at 18. Treasury
also treats R&D expensing as a tax expenditure. See Off. Mgmt. & Budget, Analytical
Perspectives Fiscal Year 2017, at 228 tbl.14-1, https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/
files/omb/budget/fy2017/assets/spec.pdf. The Treasury estimate for the ten-year budget pe-
riod of 2015-2024 is $73.41 billion. Id. The Treasury approach differs from that of the Joint
Committee in that it assumes that no alternative tax expenditure is available to benefit the
item. See Joint Committee, supra, at 18-19. In either case, the tax expenditure estimate is
not the same as a revenue estimate in that it does not take into account behavioral re-
sponses. Id. at 13; Off. Mgmt. & Budget, supra, at 226.
54 Reg. § 1.174-2(a)(1).
55 Id.
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knowledge that a product development project would be successful
would not prevent product design from qualifying as research.5 6 This
expanded permissible deductions under § 174, but it is unclear
whether it has reduced the uncertainty arising from boundary issues
(in fact, one could plausibly argue that it makes the boundary issues
even murkier).5 7 More important for our discussion, this approach
takes the concept of R&D far away from the reach of any likely mar-
ket failure of under-investment in R&D, thus undercutting that eco-
nomic rationale for the § 174 deduction.
2. Credit for Increasing Research Activities
The United States enhances the treatment of R&D expenses for
those who choose to forgo the § 174 deduction and claim a 20% R&D
tax credit that attempts to target "incremental" R&D.58 The defini-
tion of R&D expense for the credit is the same as that for § 174 ex-
pensing, with three additional requirements: (1) The research must be
for discovering information that is technological in nature and in-
tended to be useful in the development of a new or improved business
component of the taxpayer; (2) substantially all of the research activ-
ity must constitute a process of experimentation; and (3) the experi-
mentation must relate to a permitted purpose. 59 There are various
exclusions, including for research relating to style or taste,60 per-
formed after commercial production (but of a particular product),61
and to adapt a product for a particular customer. 62
The "traditional" R&D tax credit is 20% of "qualified research ex-
penses" above a base amount.63 The base amount is calculated by
multiplying the taxpayer's average gross receipts for the four prior
56 See Fox et al., note 41, § II.B.1 (citing F.S.A. 200125019 (June 22, 2001) (holding that
design and improvement of athletic footwear may qualify as § 174 R&D to the extent
attributable to eliminating uncertainty in the development or improvement of the
product)).
57 Gov't Accountability Off., note 27, at 26-28 (identifying areas of contention regarding
scope of allowable R&D expense for R&D credit; some also are applicable to § 174
expensing).
58 IRC § 41; see note 15. A taxpayer may claim a deduction and elect a reduced credit.
IRC § 280C (c)(3).
59 IRC § 41(d)(1), (3); see David L. Cameron, Research Tax Credit: Statutory Con-
struction, Regulatory Interpretation and Policy Incoherence, 9 Computer L. Rev. & Tech.
J. 63, 162 (2004) (concluding that the requirement that research be technological imposes
little substantive limitation in addition to § 174, and that the final regulations' definition of
"process of experimentation" is so "vacuous" as to "render it largely one of form and not
substance").
60 IRC § 41(d)(3)(B).
61 IRC § 41(d)(4)(A).
62 IRC § 41(d)(4)(B).
63 IRC § 41(a)(1).
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years by a "fixed-base percentage. 64 The base amount, however,
cannot be less than 50% of the taxpayer's qualified research expenses
for the taxable year.65 The fixed base percentage is the ratio of re-
search expenses to gross receipts for the years 1984 through 1988,66
for taxpayers in existence at the time.
A somewhat different calculation applies to payments for "basic re-
search" made to a qualified research organization.67 The credit is
20% of basic research payments above a base amount that is calcu-
lated separately in respect of payments to qualified research organiza-
tions. These payments generally are payments that would be
deductible as charitable deductions and are made to, generally, uni-
versities and certain tax-exempt research organizations. "Basic re-
search" is defined as "any original investigation for the advancement
of scientific knowledge not having a specific commercial objective. '68
An alternative simplified R&D tax credit is 14% of qualified re-
search expenses above a base equal to 50% of the average qualified
research expenses for the prior three taxable years.69 The effect of
having the credit determined on a moving average base of R&D ex-
penditure is that additional R&D expense in the current year de-
creases the benefit of the credit in future years. The effective rate of
the tax benefit therefore is less than the nominal rate.70 Once used,
the alternative simplified credit applies to all succeeding years unless
the taxpayer obtains IRS consent for a change. 71
Qualified research expenses include both in-house research ex-
penses and contract research expenses.72 Generally only 65% of pay-
ments for qualified research by the taxpayer to an outside person are
64 IRC § 41(c)(1).
65 IRC § 41(c)(2).
66 IRC § 41(c)(3)(A).
67 IRC § 41(a)(2), (e). This is referred to as the "university basic research credit." The
2012 amounts paid for basic research are less than 0.5% of the qualified research expenses
for the regular credit (line 1 divided by line 9 of Form 6765) and the alternative (line 19
divided by line 28 of Form 6765). See IRS, Statistics of Income 2012: Corporation Re-
search Credit tbl.1, https://www.irs.gov/uac/soi-tax-stats-corporation-research-credit.
68 IRC § 41(e)(7)(A).
69 IRC § 41(c)(5). The rate is reduced to 6% if a taxpayer has no qualified research
expenses in any one of the three prior taxable years. IRC § 41(c)(5)(B)(ii).
70 See Staff of Joint Comm. on Tax'n, 112th Cong., JCX-45-11, Tax Incentives for Re-
search, Experimentation, and Innovation 14-16 (Comm.Print 2011), https://www.jct.gov/
publications.htmlfunc=startdown&id=4358.
71 IRC § 41(c)(5)(C). This Article does not consider the specialized credit limitations
for energy research consortium research. See IRC § 41(a)(3).
72 IRC § 41(b)(1).
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included as contract research expenses. 73 To qualify for the credit, the
R&D activity must be performed in the United States.74
The R&D tax credit is a part of the general business credit,75 and
does not reduce the AMT liability of corporations or individuals. 76
The credit is overwhelmingly claimed by firms with assets of $50 mil-
lion or more.77
The R&D credit was temporary for many years, 78 but was made
permanent at the end of 2015, eliminating the sunset date. 79 The most
important reason the R&D credit had been temporary was the reve-
nue cost of making the credit permanent. It was perennially on the
list of tax extenders and each time was extended, though in some
years substantially after the date the credit expired.80 Businesses reg-
ularly criticized the temporary nature of the credit on the ground that
the uncertainty hindered their business planning. 81
73 IRC § 41(b)(3)(A). As defined in § 41(b)(2), "in-house" research consists of wages
paid to an employee engaging in qualified research or engaging in the direct supervision or
direct support of qualified research activities; amounts paid for supplies, including tangible
property other than land or depreciable property, used in the conduct of qualified re-
search; and generally amounts paid to another person for the right to use computers in the
conduct of qualified research. Under § 41(b)(3), "contract research" generally consists of
65% of amounts paid to any nonemployee for qualified research. The limit increases to
100% for payments to eligible small businesses, universities, and federal laboratories for
qualified energy research.
74 IRC § 41(d)(4)(F).
75 IRC § 38(b)(4).
76 See IRC § 56. This Article does not discuss the effects of the limitations on the busi-
ness tax credit generally. See IRC § 38(c); Rashkin, note 1, at 1067 (recommending elimi-
nation of the business tax credit limits on the R&D credit). R&D expensing is not an
alternative minimum tax preference item for corporations but is for individuals in certain
circumstances. See IRC § 174(b)(2); see notes 45 and 48.
77 In fiscal year 2008, firms with assets of $50 million or more claimed 87% of the R&D
credits claimed. See Joint Committee, note 70, at 13 tbl.3.
78 See IRC § 41(h).
79 Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-113, § 121(a)(1),
129 Stat. 2242, 3049-52. The legislation also allows small businesses to use the credit
against payroll taxes. IRC § 41(h).
80 See, e.g., Tax Increase Prevention Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-295, § 111(a), 128 Stat.
4010, 4014 (extending credit from end of 2013 to end of 2014). One consequence of retro-
active extensions of the effective date was that businesses' year-end and quarterly financial
statements issued during periods that the credit had expired could not reflect the value of
the credit as a tax benefit for the period during which the credit was not in effect. When
the credit was retroactively reinstated, as has been the practice several times in recent
years including 2015, subsequent financial statements took account of the tax benefit for
those earlier periods.
81 See, e.g., Rashkin, note 1, at 1069.
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C. Interaction with International Tax Rules
To fully evaluate the existing system of U.S. R&D incentives, it is
necessary to examine how those incentives interact with the U.S. in-
ternational income tax regime.
1. Deferral and Transfer Pricing
A U.S. corporation generally is not taxed currently on the earnings
and profits (E&P) of a controlled foreign corporation (CFC) in an
active business until the CFC distributes cash or other property to it
(or it sells the stock of the CFC).8 2 This is referred to as the deferral
privilege.
U.S. firms with multinational businesses in recent decades have em-
ployed strategies to enhance deferral by shifting to foreign affiliates in
low-tax jurisdictions intangible property that often will have benefit-
ted from R&D incentives. The tax objective is to justify income allo-
cations to low-taxed CFCs that maximize the benefit of deferral of
foreign income from current U.S. income taxation. 83
82 IRC § 301(c). A CFC is a foreign corporation the stock of which is more than 50%
owned, by vote or value, directly, indirectly, or by attribution, by one or more "United
States shareholders." IRC § 957(a). A "United States shareholder" is a U.S. person that
owns, directly, indirectly, or by attribution, 10% or more of the voting power of the foreign
corporation's stock. IRC § 951(b).
A CFC is subject to foreign base company income rules under subpart F that can cause
certain earnings to be included currently in income of a U.S. shareholder, but those rules
are largely inapplicable or avoidable in relation to active business income. See IRC
§§ 951-965. Section 956, however, provides an exception to the general rule of deferral.
Under that provision, the amount of a CFC's untaxed foreign earnings that is considered to
be invested in certain "United States property," including certain U.S. intangible property,
is treated as though it was distributed to the CFC's U.S. parent company and included in its
income. See IRC § 956(a). In this Article, "U.S. parent" or "U.S. affiliate" refers to a
"United States shareholder" as defined in § 951(b) in relation to the CFC. Under
§ 951(a)(1)(B), a U.S. shareholder of a CFC must include in income its allocable portion of
previously untaxed earnings attributable to investments made or deemed made "directly or
indirectly" by the CFC in U.S. property. The amount of the investment in U.S. property is
the average quarterly balance of the CFC's adjusted tax basis in U.S. property, reduced by
any liability to which the property is subject. See IRC §§ 951, 956, 959.
83 The incentive for public companies to pursue this income-shifting strategy is en-
hanced by the financial accounting standards. Those standards include the affiliated corpo-
rate group's consolidated worldwide sales and income in earnings, but permit a U.S. parent
company to not take into account the residual U.S. tax on foreign earnings of a foreign
affiliate if the U.S. parent company intends to indefinitely reinvest the earnings outside the
United States in a manner that will not result in residual U.S. taxation. Under Accounting
Principles Board Opinion No. 23 (APB 23), a company is permitted to defer recording
income tax expense on foreign E&P if "sufficient evidence shows that the subsidiary has
invested or will invest the undistributed earnings indefinitely." Accounting Principles
Board Opinion No. 23 (codified as FASB Accounting Standards Codification (ASC) 740-
30-25-17). Under this provision, the U.S. parent company must provide evidence of "spe-
cific plans of reinvestment of undistributed earnings of a subsidiary which demonstrate that
remittance of the earnings will be postponed indefinitely." Id. This accounting treatment
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A well-publicized example is Apple Inc., which shifted substantial
amounts of earnings to a nonresident Irish affiliate that apparently
paid an effective foreign rate of less than 2% on these earnings. 84 Ap-
ple relied on a cost-sharing agreement between the parent company
and one or more nonresident Irish subsidiaries and a very limited allo-
cation of profit to Irish branches as approved by the Irish Revenue.8 5
Under cost sharing, generally, an affiliate that shares the research
costs (and risks) commensurate with the benefits it expects to receive
from the research may be treated as owning an undivided interest in
the R&D rights produced under the arrangement.
Apple's income shifting related to IP in which its nonresident Irish
affiliates claimed to possess rights under the cost-sharing agreement. 86
The scale of the amounts shifted reflects Apple's size and profitability,
though the amounts are substantial on a relative basis as well. Apple,
however, is merely one prominent example of such income shifting.
Aggregate data shows that income shifting is practiced by numerous
multinational firms in connection with deferral.87 In addition to the
revenue concern that income that should be in the U.S. tax base is
being shifted abroad, the reduced level of effective tax on that income
also increases the incentive to shift real economic activity and factors
of production, in addition to profits, abroad.
While deferral is not normally thought of as an R&D tax expendi-
ture,88 recent work at the Organisation for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) and by scholars supports examining the
often is the largest contributor to a lower "book" tax rate than the U.S. federal statutory
rate of 35% (plus relevant state rates) for U.S. multinational companies. See, e.g., Pfizer
Corporation, FY 2015 Form 10-K, at 90 (2016), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/
78003/000007800316000077/pfe-12312015xlOkshell.htm (largest reduction from federal rate
in rate reconciliation table is for "Taxation of non-U.S. operations").
84 See Offshore Profit Shifting and the U.S. Tax Code-Part 2 (Apple Inc.): Hearing
Before the S. Homeland Security & Govt. Affairs Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations,
113th Cong. 115 (2013), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113shrg81657/pdf/CHRG-
113shrg81657.pdf (testimony of Stephen E. Shay, Professor, Harvard Law School).
85 Eur. Comm'n, State Aid SA.38373 (2014/C)-Ireland Alleged Aid to Apple § 2.3,
ec.europa.eu/competition/state-aid/cases/253200/253200_1582634_87_2.pdf.
86 See Shay Statement, note 84, at 114.
87 See Kimberly A. Clausing, The Effect of Profit Shifting on the Corporate Tax Base,
150 Tax Notes 427, 428 (Jan. 25, 2016). Based on 2006 tax return data, 45.9% of earnings of
U.S. multinationals' controlled foreign subsidiaries that reported positive income and some
foreign tax were taxed at a foreign effective rate of less than 10%. Grubert & Altshuler,
note 38, at 699 tbl.3. Less than one quarter of these foreign subsidiaries' income was taxed
at an effective foreign rate of 30% or more, and 53.9% of these foreign subsidiaries' in-
come was taxed at a foreign effective rate of 15% or less. Id.
8 Both Treasury and the Joint Committee Deferral classify deferral as a tax expendi-
ture. See Joint Committee, note 52, at 29 tbl.1; Off. Mgmt. & Budget, note 53, at 228 tbl.14-
1. For a comprehensive discussion of why deferral should be classified as a tax expenditure
and a cost-benefit analysis of deferral as a tax subsidy, see Fleming & Peroni, note 3, at
528-41.
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full array of R&D incentives on an integrated basis that takes into
account all of the effects of the tax system, including the international
tax rules, of which deferral is an important component.89
The interaction of U.S. international tax rules with R&D tax incen-
tives is complicated. The § 174 deduction is allowed for qualifying
R&D wherever performed. The § 41 tax credit is allowed only for
domestic R&D.90 Successful domestic R&D, however, may give rise
to an IP right, such as a patent, that can be registered separately in
jurisdictions around the world and thereby give rise to both domestic
and foreign IP rights and income. It has been commonplace to trans-
fer foreign IP rights to a low-taxed CFC, by license, cost sharing, or
otherwise, and for the CFC to earn low-taxed foreign income. This
strategy works under current law even if the foreign IP right derives
from R&D that has benefitted from a U.S. tax incentive.
As noted above, taxpayers also have shifted U.S. IP rights to CFCs
in low-tax jurisdictions through licenses or cost sharing. As one exam-
ple, the Staff of the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investiga-
tions found that Microsoft transferred rights to software developed in
the United States to a CFC operating in Puerto Rico, so that digital
and physical copies could be made for sale to customers in the United
States with the sales profits being taxed only in Puerto Rico.91 In fis-
cal year 2011, Microsoft's Puerto Rican subsidiary booked over $4 bil-
lion of operating income for financial statement purposes and paid
under 1% in tax (after paying $1.9 billion in cost-sharing payments). 92
Although income shifted to a low-taxed CFC with respect to a for-
eign IP right is likely to derive at least in part from the foreign juris-
diction under the laws of which the IP right is enforced. However, this
does not mean that the income is not also earned in part in the United
89 See OECD, note 8, at 128 ("A key message is that international tax policies and cross-
border tax planning should be taken into account when measuring the tax burden on R&D
.... and in assessing the design and behavioral effects of R&D tax incentives."); Noam
Noked, Integrated Tax Policy Approach to Designing Research & Development Tax Bene-
fits, 34 Va. Tax Rev. 109, 112 (2013) (concluding that the availability of income shifting may
mitigate investment disincentives under the current income tax system and changes to the
ability to shift IP income may change incentives to invest in domestic R&D).
90 See note 74 and accompanying text. Domestic R&D that is offset by a cost-sharing
payment under a cost-sharing agreement nonetheless qualifies for the R&D tax credit.
91 Offshore Profit Shifting and the U.S. Tax Code-Part 1 (Microsoft & Hewlett-Pack-
ard): Hearing Before the S. Homeland Security & Gov't Affairs Permanent Subcomm. on
Investigations, 113th Cong. (2013) (Exhibit 1: Memorandum from Sen. Carl Levin, Chair-
man, and Sen. Tom Coburn to Subcommittee Members, Offshore Profit Shifting and the
U.S. Tax Code 20-22 (Sept. 20, 2012), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112shrg760
71/pdf/CHRG-112shrg76071.pdf. Intangible rights with respect to the software lay behind
the Puerto Rican operation's claim to 47% of the operating profit on the U.S. sales. Id at
21.
92 Id.
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States if the R&D activity underlying the foreign IP right was per-
formed in the United States.
In the case of U.S. intangibles, as a tax planning matter, it is impor-
tant that the U.S. rights that are within the scope of the U.S. anti-
deferral rules for investments in U.S. property have a zero basis. Oth-
erwise, the holding of the intangible asset will trigger an inclusion of
untaxed E&P in a U.S. shareholder's income under § 956.93
There is a longstanding debate over whether trademarks and so-
called market intangibles are covered by the § 956 rules because of
the contrast between the § 956(c)(1)(D) and the § 936(h)(3)(B) defi-
nitions of an intangible.94 There are other respects in which U.S. tax-
payers may take positions that allow CFCs to hold U.S. intangible
assets without running afoul of the § 956 rules that carry varying de-
grees of risk.95
The bottom line is that it is feasible and indeed common to achieve
very low rates of tax on income earned by a CFC using IP rights that
benefited from U.S. tax incentives for R&D. The combination of
these low rates and deferral has the effect of lowering the after-tax
cost of the R&D input.
The deferral tax expenditure is a general output incentive directed
at business conducted outside the United States. It is not designed as
a domestic R&D incentive. 96 Nonetheless, while not targeted at the
externalities that presumably are the object of the input R&D incen-
tives, deferral does disproportionately benefit R&D-intensive indus-
93 See IRC § 956(a), (c)(1)(D). The amount of U.S. property is measured with refer-
ence to asset basis rather than fair market value. IRC § 956(a). For this reason, taxpayers'
cost sharing with respect to U.S. intangibles is usually designed to be for self-developed
intangibles so that the § 174 deduction can be used to avoid capitalization of development
costs and the resulting basis in a U.S. asset. If the cost sharing covers a purchased U.S.
intangible, the § 956 rules will be triggered because the foreign affiliate will be considered
to jointly own an asset that has a positive U.S. tax basis. Many taxpayers do not focus on
this issue and the authors are not aware that the issue has ever been audited. As one
example of a potentially dangerous foot fault, a company that has a cost-sharing arrange-
ment covering U.S. intangible rights should not make a § 59 election to amortize R&D
expenditures that are covered by the cost-sharing election if the basis would be considered
in a U.S. intangible.
94 See, e.g., Ken Brewer & Bruce Reynolds, Some Intangibles May Be Untouched by
U.S. Internal Revenue Code Section 956, 21 Tax Notes Int'l 1797 (Oct. 16, 2000); Paul K.
Marineau, What Lies Beneath Section 956(c)(1)(D): Does an Intangible Property Right
Constitute an Investment in U.S. Property?, 9 BYU Int'l L. & Mgmt. Rev. 81, 90 (2012).
The § 936(h)(3)(B) definition of intangible property includes trademarks, trade names, and
brand names, while the § 956(c)(1)(D) definition makes no mention of those items but
does include rights "similar" to copyrights.
95 For example, it may be possible to hold an active intangible in a company with no
E&P and rely on § 954(c)(6) to strip out the return to the intangible.
96 See U.S. Treasury Dep't, The Deferral of Income Earned Through U.S. Controlled
Foreign Corporations: A Policy Study 3 (2000), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/
tax-policy/Documents/Report-SubpartF-2000.pdf.
Imaged with the permission of Tax Law Review of New York University School of Law
Imaged with the permission of Tax Law Review of New York University School of Law
[Vol. 69:
R&D TAX INCENTIVES
tries, such as the pharmaceutical and information technology
industries, that have substantial intangible property that can be
"moved" offshore by transfer or license. Deferral also disproportion-
ately benefits the largest-sized firms (such as those with over $50 mil-
lion in assets) that also are the largest beneficiaries of the R&D tax
credit.97
The tax treatment of intangible property is the link between the
R&D input subsidies and the deferral of U.S. income tax on foreign
business income. For example, if R&D expenditures were capitalized,
instead of currently deducted, U.S. intangibles would have a positive
tax basis and the § 956 anti-deferral "investment in U.S. property"
rules would apply to restrict this element of income stripping.98
2. Apportionment of R&D Expenses to Foreign Income
A U.S. taxpayer that earns foreign income from international oper-
ations and that has currently deductible § 174 R&D expense must al-
locate and apportion the expense between foreign-source and U.S.-
source income for purposes of the foreign tax credit limitation. 99 For
a taxpayer in an excess-credit position, the reduction of foreign in-
come by the allocated R&D deduction has the effect of denying for
that year a foreign tax credit against U.S. tax on that amount of in-
come. Accordingly, taxpayers that need a greater foreign tax credit
limitation (that is, they are in an excess-credit position) prefer to allo-
cate as little R&D expense as possible to foreign income. The alloca-
tion rules are very taxpayer-favorable in this regard and in a range of
cases under-allocate R&D to foreign income.
The taxpayer-favorable R&D expense allocation and apportion-
ment rules are treated as a tax expenditure by the Joint Committee
but not by Treasury. The JCT tax expenditure estimate is relatively
small at approximately $200 million of revenue loss annually.' 00
There is little empirical evidence on the effect of the taxpayer-
favorable rules for allocating R&D deductions away from foreign in-
come. The most recent Treasury study of R&D expense allocation
rules, which accompanied adoption of final regulations in 1995, does
97 See Joint Committee, note 2, at 115 tbl.31.
98 Under current law, capitalization would not cause the § 956 inclusion rules to apply to
foreign intangible rights, including those derived in whole or in part from R&D performed
in the United States.
99 See IRC §§ 174, 864(f); Reg. § 1.861-17. The rules for allocating and apportioning
R&D expense are described in Am. Bar Ass'n Tax Sec. Task Force on Int'l Tax Reform,
Report of the Task Force on International Tax Reform, 59 Tax Law. 649, 767-71 (2006).
100 Joint Committee, note 52, at 28 tbl.1.
Imaged with the permission of Tax Law Review of New York University School of Law
Imaged with the permission of Tax Law Review of New York University School of Law
20161
TAX LAW REVIEW
not address the effects of the allocation on R&D investment.10 We
are skeptical that the R&D deduction allocation rules are a cost-effec-
tive R&D incentive since, like § 174, they are not targeted at R&D in
which there is under-investment.
An effective disallowance of domestic deductions for foreign-allo-
cated R&D expense would increase the after-tax cost of performing
R&D. It is unclear how much it would affect the amount of R&D
investment in the United States. A claim that would raise a serious
concern, if true, is that the additional after-tax cost of R&D resulting
from disallowance of deductions for R&D outlays would trigger a re-
location of U.S. knowledge personnel abroad or a preference for for-
eign over U.S. researchers. The impact of increasing the tax cost of
R&D by allocating R&D expense to foreign income on the location of
R&D, however, is an empirical question that is as yet unanswered. 10 2
The risk of other countries attracting R&D personnel or assets is a
part of a larger issue, which is the extent to which the United States
should respond to international competition for R&D investment,
such as that presented by patent or innovation boxes. 103 But before
turning to the possibility of new R&D incentives, it is critical to ob-
serve that, as demonstrated in the preceding discussion, the United
States already provides substantial incentives for R&D in the form of
the § 174 deduction, the § 41 credit, the deferral privilege, and tax-
payer-generous R&D expense allocation rules.1°4 Importantly, the
targeting of these incentives is weak and the evidence that they are
cost-effective is sparse.
III. WHY SUBSIDIZE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT?
A. Market Failure- Under-investment in R&D
Legal discussions of R&D tax incentives generally rely on two
premises from the economic literature. The first is the importance of
technological innovations to economic growth. 0 5 The second is that
101 U.S. Treas. Dep't, The Relationship Between U.S. Research and Development and
Foreign Income (May 19, 1995), available at BNA Daily Tax Rep. (May 22, 1995) (stating
that the range of uncertainty of the relationship between domestic R&D and foreign in-
come is large).
102 See Michael J. Graetz & Rachael Doud, Technological Innovation, International
Competition, and the Challenges of International Income Taxation, 113 Colum. L. Rev.
347, 360 (2013) ("extant studies do not indicate whether R&D tax incentives drive firms'
decisions of where to locate R&D").
103 See notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
104 See Sections II.B and II.C.
105 See, e.g., Graetz & Doud, note 102, at 348 & n.1 (citing Robert M. Solow, Technical
Change and the Aggregate Production Function, 39 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 312, 320 (1957));
see also Noked, note 89, at 114.
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R&D that leads to innovative knowledge is under-produced in the ab-
sence of government support. 1°6 R&D is under-produced because ab-
sent government intervention, the knowledge produced by R&D can
be used by other firms (which would increase social welfare), but
firms cannot capture the full returns from their investment in the
R&D (which would discourage private investment). 10 7
Positive spillovers from (successful) R&D include rent spillovers
and knowledge spillovers.108 These spillovers can lead to improved
labor productivity and higher wage jobs, which are believed to occur
primarily in proximity to where the R&D is conducted. 10 9 For these
reasons, countries compete to attract R&D activity within their bor-
ders. Some, but not all, countries rely on R&D tax incentives.110 The
current vogue among tax havens and, more recently, some larger
economies, is to use patent boxes to benefit R&D returns to IP.1
Longstanding U.S. input R&D tax incentives are deductibility for
R&D and/or an R&D tax credit. To date, the United States has not
adopted an explicit output incentive, such as a patent or innovation
box, though, as discussed above, U.S. international tax rules have
much of the effect of an output incentive by reducing the effective tax
rate on deferred earnings attributable to intangibles resulting from
U.S. R&D activity. In any event, the same principles should apply for
evaluating an output R&D incentive as for an input R&D incentive.
106 See, e.g., Graetz & Doud, note 102, at 349; Hansson & Brokelind, note 1, at 175-76;
Noked, note 89, at 114. This view is based on an "incomplete private appropriability"
problem. See Paul A. David, Bronwyn H. Hall & Andrew A. Toole, Is Public R&D a
Complement or Substitute for Private R&D? A Review of the Econometric Evidence, 29
Res. Pol'y 497, 501 (2000) (referring to the work of R.R. Nelson and Kenneth Arrow);
Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in
The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors 609, 621
(Richard Nelson ed., 1962).
107 See Graetz & Doud, note 102, at 349 (citing the economic literature); see also
Noked, note 89, at 115. But see Rashkin, note 1, (criticizing the argument that private
returns do not capture the full benefit of R&D expenditures).
108 Hall et al., note 18, at 1965 (Rent spillovers occur "when a firm or consumer
purchases R&D-incorporated goods or services at prices that do not reflect their user
value, because of imperfect price discrimination due to asymmetric information and trans-
action costs, imperfect appropriability and imitation, or mismeasurement of the true value
of the transaction due to the lack of hedonic prices." Knowledge spillovers occur when an
R&D project produces knowledge that can be useful to another firm in doing its own
research because of the inability to prevent knowledge from benefitting a competitor.).
109 See Graetz & Doud, note 102, at 361-62 (summarizing the economic literature on the
effect of increased R&D on productivity and employment, and noting that the greatest
effect of such spillovers are in nearby, rather than distant, locations).
110 See Eur. Comm'n, A Study on R&D Tax Incentives: Final Report 17 (Nov. 28,
2014), https://ec.europa.eu/futurium/en/system/files/ged/28-taxud-study-on md-tax-incen
tives_-_2-14.pdf. Germany does not employ R&D tax incentives, but provides substantial
support to research and technology through public expenditures and public support for
education. See Hemel & Ouellette, note 23, at 307-09.
111 See text accompanying notes 158-61.
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B. From Theory to Practice
1. Should R&D Be Subsidized? Which R&D?
There are studies that suggest that the social returns to R&D are
greater, and in some studies much greater, than private returns. 112
There is, however, little clarity about how to identify and test social
benefits from specific R&D.113
Assuming for the sake of discussion that the differences between
social returns and private returns justify governmental support for pri-
vate (for-profit) investment in R&D,114 it is necessary to identify
which R&D should be the target for intervention. It is implausible
that the gap between social and private returns is uniform for all
R&D. If there are differences, they should be taken into account, if
possible, in designing R&D incentives.
The first step is to specify what we mean by R&D and then to dif-
ferentiate among different kinds of R&D to assess the likelihood that
the social return exceeds the private return. The scope of R&D ex-
penditures covered in § 174, described above, 115 may be compared
with the definition used from the OECD's Frascati Manual, which is
the internationally accepted standard practice for classifying expendi-
tures in measuring research and experimental development:
Research and experimental development (R&D) comprise
creative work undertaken on a systematic basis in order to
increase the stock of knowledge, including knowledge of
man, culture and society, and the use of this stock of knowl-
edge to devise new applications.1 16
112 See Joint Committee, note 70, at 7; Cong. Budget Office, R&D and Productivity
Growth: A Background Paper 23-28 (2005), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbo
files/ftpdocs/64xx/doc6482/06-17-r-d.pdf; Int'l Monetary Fund, note 1, at 34 ("social rates of
return to private R&D are generally estimated to be two to three times the private return"
(emphasis omitted)); Zvi Griliches, R&D, Education, and Productivity: A Retrospective
70 (2000) (surveying the literature to find that "[t]he estimated excess rate of return to
R&D is about 25 percent on average"); Hall et al., note 18, at 1065-73 (surveying the
economic literature and observing difficulties of measuring private and social returns to
R&D using case study and aggregate or macro methods).
113 See Hall & Van Reenan, note 34, at 456-57.
114 See David et al., note 106, at 508; Hansson & Brokelind, note 1, at 186. The general
assumption is that R&D generates new knowledge and that new knowledge is the main
source of new technological opportunities, which in turn are expected to result in higher
private returns.
115 See Subsection II.B.1.
116 OECD, Frascati Manual 2002: Proposed Standard Practice for Surveys on Research
and Experimental Development, The Measurement of Scientific and Technological Activi-
ties 30 (6th ed. 2002).
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The manual goes on to distinguish among basic research, applied
research, and experimental development, 117 as well as to describe the
boundaries between R&D activity and non-R&D activity in adjacent
areas. 118
The essential difference between the § 174 definition for qualifying
R&D11 9 and that used by most countries appears to be the degree of
novelty and risk that is necessary to qualify for an incentive.1 20 The
lack of emphasis on novelty and experimental risk for the U.S. R&D
incentives as they are applied means that the incentive extends to ac-
tivity that is less likely to involve a market failure of under-invest-
ment. Indeed, the more open-ended nature of the U.S. definition of
R&D expenditure has induced accounting firms to offer "R&D stud-
ies" that amount to little more than inefficient expense characteriza-
tion exercises for expenditures that already have been made.121
117 The three categories are described as follows:
Basic research is experimental or theoretical work undertaken primarily to
acquire new knowledge of the underlying foundation of phenomena and ob-
servable facts, without any particular application or use in view. Applied re-
search is also original investigation undertaken in order to acquire new
knowledge. It is, however, directed primarily towards a specific practical aim
or objective. Experimental development is systematic work, drawing on ex-
isting knowledge gained from research and/or practical experience, which is
directed to producing new materials, products or devices, to installing new
processes, systems and services, or to improving substantially those already
produced or installed."
Id. at 30.
118 See id. at 30-33.
119 See notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
120 There are other definitional differences that are significant but not as central to our
inquiry. One area for future work could be a systematic review of the differences between
the definitions used for different purposes in the United States, in the OECD's Frascati
Manual, and in other countries' R&D tax incentives. See European Commission, note 110,
at 59 (description of novelty requirements used by countries for R&D incentives). As one
example, the U.K. test for R&D tax relief requires that the activity be directed at an ad-
vance in science or technology through the resolution of scientific or technological uncer-
tainties. HM Revenue & Customs, Corporation Tax: Research and Development tax relief
(last updated 15 Apr. 2016), https://www.gov.uk/guidance/corporation-tax-research-and-
development-rd-relief. The economic literature describes these differences at a very high
level and generally does not measure effects of differences in novelty required. See, e.g.,
Int'l Monetary Fund, note 1, at 30 ("The role of innovation in driving growth is difficult to
analyze because of conceptual and data limitations. Most empirical work concentrates on
the process of technological change, for which quantitative indicators are available, both as
inputs (such as R&D investment and the number of researchers) and outputs (such as the
number of patents and publications."). R&D investment is based on business enterprise
R&D, the standards for which may vary according to whether the data source is GAAP
reporting or a Frascati-based methodology. See FASB Accounting Standards Codification
Topic 730, Research and Development; OECD, Frascati Manual, note 116.
121 The PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) website advertises the Tax Products Delivery
Group's R&D credit services: "Stemming from our federal and state research tax credit
law and examination experience, we have developed a flexible, customizable technology
solution designed to build upon your existing technologies. Our unique web-based solu-
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Once the scope of what is meant as R&D is identified, the task then
is to determine the R&D for which the social return exceeds the pri-
vate return. It is customary to differentiate between basic R&D and
development R&D, though the exact line may be unclear.122 Basic
R&D is generally thought to refer to work to acquire new knowledge
of phenomena and observable facts without a particular or identified
application or use as the objective. Development R&D is directed at
drawing on existing knowledge to produce new materials, products,
devices, processes, systems, or services. One would expect that basic
R&D is riskier in terms of eventually generating a financial return.
Thus, it is not surprising that basic R&D is much more heavily the
province of public expenditure than private R&D investment. 123 Pub-
lic expenditure on basic R&D is directed primarily to government and
academic institutions, including the military, universities, and mostly
nonprofit private research institutions. This may be because the sub-
sidy that would be necessary to induce basic research by private firms
would have to be substantial and would not be justified if the greater
knowledge were monopolized by the private-sector participants. 124
Moreover, as opposed to an open-ended tax credit for private parties,
there are established procedures for government R&D grants through
the NSF and the NIH to utilize both government and university exper-
tise and to include a peer review process to screen proposals for qual-
tion utilizes Microsoft SharePoint and is designed to minimize disruption to your business
by incorporating data from existing payroll and ERP systems. Our team will review your
current R&D tax credit methodology and existing technologies to identify opportunities to
further leverage our team and technology." PricewaterhouseCoopers, Research and De-
velopment Credits Services, http://www.pwc.com/us/en/tax-products-delivery-group/re-
search-development-credit.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2016). PwC is not unique among the
Big Four accounting firms in providing these services.
A practitioner recently told one of the authors the following story about settling a claim
for additional R&D credit on appeal:
Appeals: "[John,] do you have any idea what this R&D does?"
[John]: "No, I have no .... idea at all."
Appeals: "Neither do I. How about 50%?"
While almost certainly apocryphal, the story conveys the flavor of what can happen when
there is a weak definitional boundary and, as a result, it is difficult to assess accurately the
hazards of litigation.
122 The OECD Frascati Manual differentiates among basic R&D, applied R&D, and
experimental R&D. See note 117. For purposes of this discussion, it is sufficient to differ-
entiate between basic R&D and development R&D.
123 See Int'l Monetary Fund, note 1, at 31; Ashish Arora, Sharon Belenzon & Andrea
Patacconi, Killing the Golden Goose? The Decline of Science in Corporate R&D (Nat'l
Bureau Econ. Research, Working Paper 20902, 2015), http://www.nber.org/papers/w20902.
124 The fact that the take-up of the university basic research credit is trivial in size sup-
ports this contention. See data cited in note 67.
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ity.125 In light of the more speculative returns from basic R&D, these
protections seem quite sensible. 26
While there may be a social return from both basic R&D and devel-
opment R&D, the gap between social and private return likely is ma-
terially smaller for development R&D. Presumably the pay-off
period for successful basic R&D is much longer than for development
R&D and, when combined with the additional risk of failure and
knowledge spillover, would require materially higher returns to justify
private investment. One policy inference may be that it would be a
mistake to cannibalize public expenditure on R&D, and particularly
basic R&D, to incentivize private investment in development R&D.
Public and private R&D investments may overlap in important ways,
but they likely are more complements than substitutes for each
other. 127
Within the scope of development R&D, the more experimental the
research or development work is, the greater the risk of failure and
the likelihood of under-investment. Establishing this differentiation is
difficult in practice. As an indirect piece of evidence, a nonspecialist
would tend to assume that a patented invention or matter likely would
be the product of new knowledge having a relatively high social re-
turn, because of the requirement of nonobviousness to a person hav-
ing ordinary skill in the subject for a patent to issue.1 28 Yet, based on
somewhat dated data, almost half of litigated patent infringement
cases are lost for lack of validity, and the most frequent statutory basis
for the invalidity of the patent is that the patented invention is obvi-
ous. 129 After changes in patent law review procedures, the Patent
Trial and Review Board's invalidation percentage increased in 2015 to
125 The Hemel and Ouellette framework highlights that it is possible to include design
features associated with a grant in a tax credit and vice versa. Hemel & Ouellette, note 23,
at 307. Nonetheless, much of the administrative efficiency of relying on taxation self-re-
porting is lost if the tax relief is conditioned on a government approval process. In the case
of basic research, there would seem to be little advantage to reliance on a tax credit and
there would be the disadvantages of not having the annual oversight and review of outlay
expenditures.
126 Reliance on the government for decisionmaking, however, raises the specter of inef-
ficient rent seeking by lobbyists. Moreover, there may be a difference in the level of take-
up of subsidies awarded by grant. See European Commission, note 110, at 39-40 (describ-
ing economic literature on direct subsidies as ambiguous as to effectiveness).
127 The evidence on this point is ambiguous but points to complementarity. See David
et al., note 106, at 525.
128 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000).
129 See Andrew Blair-Stanek, Profits as Commercial Success, 117 Yale L.J. 642, 646
(2008). This problem contributed to a provision modifying U.S. patent procedure to allow
post-grant review of patents within nine months of the grant. Leahy-Smith America In-
vents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29 § 6, 125 Stat. 286 (2012). This weakness in patent grants also
calls into question the validity of using patents as a measure for evaluating innovation
incentives.
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an astonishing 75% (compared to 31% in Europe). 130 Even taking
into account that these data pertain to challenged patents, this sug-
gests that much of the R&D that leads to patents may be development
R&D with comparatively low social returns.
The difficulty of identifying socially useful development R&D may
be claimed as a reason why the government should leave it to the
private market to identify R&D to be supported with a tax incen-
tive.131 However, it is difficult to identify which R&D gives rise to
knowledge or inventions that are not obvious (or at least satisfies the
nonobviousness standard for patents). To this extent, an incentive
may be misdirected at investments whose social benefits do not ex-
ceed the private return and encourage excessive investment in an ac-
tivity as well as lose revenue that must be made up in other ways.
As noted above, the condition for deduction under § 174 and for
the R&D tax credit is simply that the expenditure be for a new devel-
opment.1 32 The uncertainty requirement has been watered down and
there is no meaningful requirement that the activity be directed at
resolution of scientific or technological uncertainties. Serious consid-
eration should be given to revisiting the definition of R&D that quali-
fies for a tax benefit to increase the likelihood that the tax benefit
applies to R&D whose social value exceeds the private benefit (that
is, R&D that would not be carried on without the tax benefit).
2. Supporting Innovation
Work at the OECD and by students of innovation has shown that
traditional concepts of knowledge leading to technological change and
economic growth have been too narrow and must be broadened to
include other elements of knowledge-based capital. 133 This may raise
a question whether R&D tax incentives are aimed at the right target
because the OECD's work emphasizes that growth based on innova-
tion does not tie only to R&D in the traditional sense:
130 Douglas R. Nemic & Scott M. Flanz, After Period of High Invalidation Rates, New
US Patent Challenge Procedures May Slow Down to Moderate Pace (Apr. 26, 2016),
https://www.skadden.com/insights/after-period-high-invalidation-rates-new-us-patent-chal-
lenge-procedures-may-slow-down-moder.
131 See Schizer, note 23, at 293-94. But see Rashkin, note 1, at 1063-64 (R&D credit
goes to the wrong companies for the wrong R&D).
132 See notes 44, 54, and 59, and accompanying text. Research qualifies for the R&D tax
credit if it is undertaken for the purpose of discovering information that is technological in
nature, is intended to be useful in the development of a new or improved business compo-
nent of the taxpayer, and constitutes elements of a process of experimentation for a pur-
pose that relates to a new or improved function, performance, or reliability or quality. IRC
§ 41(d).
133 See OECD, note 8, at 3; Modica & Neubig, note 8, at 7-11 (non-R&D knowledge-
based capital investment is important source of labor productivity and economic growth).
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While this programme of work has numerous intellectual
antecedents, its immediate inspiration was a finding high-
lighted in the OECD's Innovation Strategy, published in
2010, that many innovating firms do not invest in R&D. In-
stead, their innovation efforts are driven by investments in a
broader range of intangibles assets, from software and large
data sets to designs, firm-specific human capital and new or-
ganisational processes. These intangible assets are referred
to... as knowledge-based capital. 134
This understanding of innovation strategies, with its heavy emphasis
on human creativity and its wide-ranging outputs, points to supporting
the public investment in broadly-defined human capital and in the le-
gal and physical infrastructure on which the private sector relies, in-
stead of attempting to target a weakly specified market failure with
expanded R&D tax measures. Moreover, if social returns to R&D are
correctly understood to be a residual, it highlights the dubious basis
for attributing causality of those returns solely to narrowly-defined
R&D. Thus, the analysis of knowledge-based capital's role in innova-
tion suggests that restrictive targeting of an incentive may not be justi-
fied. As described in the next Section, there also is evidence that
small- and medium-size businesses, and newer businesses, respond
more than large businesses to R&D incentives. Accordingly, if one
wants to use tax policy to encourage innovation, it may well be that
lower tax rates targeted at newer businesses will be more effective
than a narrower and poorly targeted R&D incentive. 135
3. Whose R&D Should Benefit?
Determining who should receive R&D tax incentives is not an easy
matter. For example, consider the import of availability of financing.
134 OECD, note 8, at 3; see also Modica & Neubig, note 8, at 7-9 (non-R&D knowledge-
based capital intangible assets estimated to be 70% of total such capital stock and in some
cases contribute more to productivity than R&D). The finding that innovation may not be
solely or even primarily linked to R&D raises questions about the targeting of incentives.
135 See Hansson & Brokelind, note 1, at 172 ("[E]conomists in general believe that pro-
viding tax incentives is a less effective means of attracting investment than lowering the
general tax rate."); Martin A. Sullivan, Will International Tax Reform Slow U.S. Technol-
ogy Development?, 141 Tax Notes 459, 463 (Nov. 4, 2013) ("Congress should not rule out
eliminating or scaling back research incentives, especially when it has an attractive and
undoubtedly beneficial alternative use of those funds: lowering the statutory corporate
rate."); see also Joint Committee, note 70, at 19 ("The basic economic rationale [for a
research tax credit] argues that a subsidy to reduce the cost of research should be equally
applied across all sectors."); Rashkin, note 1, at 1061 (questioning whether companies re-
spond to R&D incentives and arguing that "companies do R&D because they have to
create products to compete regardless of whether there is a tax incentive").
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A justification often given for R&D incentives is that under-invest-
ment in R&D results from an inability to obtain external financing. 136
The level of risk, the lack of hard assets for collateral, the timing of
positive cash flow returns, and the asymmetry of information between
lender and borrower all make it difficult to obtain debt financing.
R&D subsidies are said to mitigate this reason for under-investment
in R&D. 137
Ironically, however, it is a common feature of business income tax
incentives that most of the benefit goes to the largest and most profit-
able taxpayers who least need assistance. That is true for the R&D
tax credit as well. 138 This may be justified on the ground that these
taxpayers have demonstrated their efficiency and success, but it raises
a question regarding the extent to which a scarcity of financing causes
under-investment in private R&D among different categories of tax-
payers. In particular, the financing problem will differ materially for
creditworthy versus credit-constrained taxpayers and the latter will
tend to be smaller and newer than the former.
Large taxpayers have multiple advantages in undertaking develop-
ment R&D that are not available to small- and medium-sized busi-
nesses and individual entrepreneurs. Large businesses can afford to
diversify the risk through engaging in multiple projects and the knowl-
edge from successful projects may be diffused more efficiently within
a single enterprise. Large businesses have access to lower-cost financ-
ing in capital markets that would not be accessible by small- or me-
dium-sized enterprises and entrepreneurs.1 39 In addition, a large
business is more likely to have resources to devote to registering and
protecting IP rights and bearing the other transactions costs that pre-
serve and enhance returns to R&D. If profitable, larger businesses
can fully utilize input tax incentives, through either expensing R&D or
taking the R&D credit. Large multinational businesses are able to use
various tax planning strategies to take advantage of cross-border in-
come shifting to increase their after-tax return. This planning will not
end as a result of the OECD's Base Erosion and Profit Shifting
(BEPS) project,1 40 because even if countries follow the OECD's
BEPS recommendations in developing their own tax laws, BEPS only
136 See Hansson & Brokelind, note 1, at 176; Int'l Monetary Fund, note 1, at 35.
137 See id.
138 In 2012, 84% of corporate R&D credit amounts were claimed by corporations with
receipts over $250 million. IRS, Statistics of Income 1990-2012: Totals of Research Credit
Amounts, by Size of Business Receipts fig.C (2015), https://www.irs.gov/uac/SOI-Tax-Stats-
Corporation-Research-Credit; see also Kim, note 35, at 183 (80% of R&D credit distrib-
uted to corporations with over $250 million of business receipts in 2001-2005).
139 See Hansson & Brokelind, note 136, at 176.
140 See OECD, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project 14 (2015), https://
www.oecd.org/ctp/beps-explanatory-statement-2015.pdf.
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targets some of the income-shifting strategies available to multination-
als to increase their after-tax returns. The various BEPS proposals
would not appear to affect the planning used by Microsoft to shift
income into Puerto Rico. 141
Small- and medium-sized businesses and entrepreneurs generally
will not have the same resources, including access to financing, to
achieve diversification and to expend on IP administration and protec-
tion. In many cases, they also will be enterprises with solely or prima-
rily domestic operations that do not have the same cross-border tax
savings opportunities. Some countries, however, have specifically di-
rected R&D tax benefits to these smaller businesses and entrepre-
neurs or have provided more generous benefits to those types of
taxpayers. 142
A final incongruity is that the benefit of the R&D credit goes dis-
proportionately to the manufacturing sector (64% in 2011) and far
less to services. 143 It is not clear why tax policy should favor this sec-
tor over others, particularly if the credit is not well-targeted to address
a market inefficiency. If the credit were retained and more properly
targeted, it might be possible to simplify the credit and make it availa-
ble more easily.
In summary, the benefits of R&D tax incentives tend to be concen-
trated among taxpayers who least need assistance.
4. Location of R&D
If tax incentives are going to be granted for private R&D, should it
matter where development R&D is performed? There is literature
supporting the view that R&D spillovers are greatest in proximity to
where R&D is performed.1 44 Evidence of the effect of tax incentives
on the location of R&D, however, is limited. 145
In the analogous context of depreciation, accelerated depreciation
is not allowed with respect to assets used outside the United States.1 46
As described above, the R&D tax credit is limited to R&D performed
141 See note 91 and accompanying text.
142 European Commission, note 110, at 20 (ten counties have R&D incentives targeted
at small businesses); Int'l Monetary Fund, note 1, at 35 (describing countries targeting
small and new firms).
143 IRS, Statistics of Income 2011: Corporations Claiming a Credit for Increasing Re-
search Activities tbl.1 (2015), https://www.irs.gov/uac/SOI-Tax-Stats-Corporation-Re-
search-Credit.
144 See, e.g., Graetz & Doud, note 102, at 361.
145 See id. at 358-60; Maryann P. Feldman & Dieter F. Kogler, Stylized Facts in the
Geography of Innovation, in 1 Handbook of the Economics of Innovation, note 18, at 381.
146 IRC § 168(g)(4).
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in the United States.147 It would seem a straightforward policy re-
sponse, at a minimum, also to deny § 174 expensing to foreign-per-
formed R&D and require that R&D performed outside the United
States be capitalized (if R&D is not capitalized generally, as discussed
below). 148
5. Interaction of IP Protections with Tax Benefits
Finally, there is an issue whether tax incentives should be allowed
for R&D that later benefits from patent, trade secret, copyright, or
similar market-enhancing legal protection. These nontax property
rights allow the owner of the right to exclude use by another. While
patent applications are public, other IP rights, such as trade secrets,
allow an owner to prevent disclosure of the knowledge embedded in
the IP and, in some states, may be a basis for employee and contractor
noncompetition agreements. 149 Joseph Stiglitz points out that IP
rights have the effect of reducing the knowledge pool available to in-
novators, which may have a negative effect on R&D investment and
the level of innovation.1 50 It is an important question whether the pri-
vate benefits obtained from IP rights should serve as a basis for re-
couping a prior tax subsidy for R&D activity that led to those
rights.1 51 If so, there could be a mechanism for recapture of R&D tax
expenditure benefits if the R&D is successful and results in ownership
of IP rights.1 52 Alternatively, the grant of the tax incentive could be
subject to an ex ante condition that the benefitted IP be subject to
disclosure.
As the preceding discussion shows, an objective examination of the
need for, and effectiveness of, R&D tax incentives in the context of
the overall IP ecosystem is overdue.
C. Are Tax R&D Subsidies Effective?
A leading, though now older, study by Bronwyn Hall and John Van
Reenen of the effectiveness of R&D tax incentives observes that ide-
ally the analyst would measure the social return to R&D spending at
147 IRC § 41(d)(4)(F).
148 Representative Camp's tax reform proposal would have provided for slower amorti-
zation for foreign R&D. See H.R. 1, § 3108, 113th Cong., 2d Sess. (2014), https://www
.congress.gov/bill/l3th-congress/house-bill/1 (providing for five-year amortization of do-
mestic § 174 expenditures and fifteen-year amortization of foreign R&D expenditures).
149 See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code § 499c (Deering 2016); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93, § 42 (Lex-
isNexis 2016).
150 Stiglitz, note 11, at 2-3.
151 See Joint Committee, note 70, at 7.
152 The reference to tax expenditure is meant to suggest that only the benefit that would
not be allowed under a normal income tax would be subject to recapture.
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the margin in relation to the marginal benefit of alternative uses of tax
dollars (for example, for deficit reduction, for human capital invest-
ment such as in education, or for lower tax rates). 153 This has proven
too difficult and, instead, most studies attempt to compare the incre-
mental private R&D expenditure with the revenue cost of the incen-
tive. 154 This Hall and Van Reenen study suggests that given the
present inability to disaggregate R&D into components that make
strong contributions to economic growth and components that make
lesser contributions to such growth, and into components that are
highly responsive to incentives and those that are less so, it is not fea-
sible to evaluate the social benefit of R&D, its actual effect on eco-
nomic growth (supposedly the underlying reason for favoring R&D
investment), or the marginal effectiveness of the incentives. As sum-
marized by Michael Graetz and Rachael Doud, "the economic litera-
ture suggests that R&D tax incentives may increase the amount of
R&D and number of R&D employees but their cost effectiveness is
less certain than their advocates claim. ' 155 This may be a generous
reading of the efficacy of R&D tax incentives.
In the United States, dueling studies from the left and right political
perspectives find some common ground in supporting R&D tax incen-
tives, 156 but we actually have little reliable information on the welfare
effects of current R&D tax incentives. Consistent with our work on
other tax expenditure issues, 157 we would argue that the burden
should be on the advocates of R&D tax incentives to show that the
recommended tax expenditure achieves its goals on a cost-effective
basis such that the marginal social welfare benefit exceeds the oppor-
tunity cost of an alternative use of public revenue.
153 See Hall & Van Reenen, note 34, at 456-57.
154 See Jason J. Fichtner & Adam N. Michael, Mercatus Ctr. Geo. Mason U., Can a
Research and Development Tax Credit Be Properly Designed for Economic Efficiency? 8
(2015); mercatus.org/sites/default/files/Fichtner-R-D-Tax-Creditpdf; Laura Tyson & Greg
Lindon, Ctr. for Am. Progress, The Corporate R&D Tax Credit and U.S. Innovation and
Competitiveness: Gauging the Economic and Fiscal Effectiveness of the Credit 3 (2012),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/tax-reform/report/2012/01/06/10975/the-corpo-
rate-rd-tax-credit-and-u-s-innovation-and-competitiveness/.
155 Graetz & Doud, note 102, at 362. This is consistent with the findings of a European
Commission staff working paper. See European Commission, note 110, at 39-40; see also
Hansson & Brokelind, note 1, at 189-91 (analysis of eighteen European countries shows no
support for R&D incentives having a significant positive impact on the number of patents,
on inbound foreign direct investment, or on economic growth).
156 Compare Tyson & Lindon, note 154, at 3 (recommending that the R&D credit be
made permanent and more generous), with Fichtner & Michael, note 154, at 24-25 (favor-
ing repeal of the credit and reducing the corporate tax rate or a second-best solution of
making the credit permanent, eliminating claims on amended returns, expanding the defi-
nition of qualifying R&D, and simplifying calculation of the credit).
157 See, e.g., Fleming & Peroni, note 3, at 525-28.
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D. Patent Boxes and Inter-Nation Tax Competition
1. Patent Boxes and BEPS Action 5
A patent box or innovation box generally refers to a regime in
which income attributed under some metric to a patent or similar
property, or a related category of income, is taxed at a lower explicit
rate or at a lower effective rate through allowance of a special deduc-
tion in relation to the income.158 Many European countries have
adopted some form of patent box.159 The European Commission be-
came concerned about patent boxes under European Union Code of
Conduct rules and the OECD took up the issue as an example of po-
tentially harmful tax competition.16° In both cases, countries have
agreed that a condition for continued allowance of such regimes was
that certain nexus requirements be satisfied. 161
2. Boustany-Neal Innovation Box Proposal
In the United States, Representatives Charles Boustany and Rich-
ard Neal published a discussion draft of an innovation box proposal,
the Innovation Promotion Act of 2015 (IPA 2015).162 IPA 2015 would
allow a deduction equal to 71% of the lesser of innovation box profit
or taxable income (determined without the IPA deduction) for the tax
158 See note 21; see also Annette Alstadsaeter, Salvador Barrios, Gaetan Nicodeme,
Agnieszka Maria Skonieczna & Antonio Vezzani, Patent Boxes Design, Patents Location
and Local R&D 8-9 (Euro. Comm'n, Taxation Papers No. 57, 2015), http://ec.europa.eu/
taxation-customs/resources/documents/taxation/gen-info/economic-analysis/tax-papers/
taxation-paper 57.pdf; see also Daniel Shaviro, The Crossroads Versus the Seesaw: Get-
ting a "Fix" on Recent International Tax Policy Developments, 69 Tax L. Rev. 1, 34 (2015)
("The more plausible motivation for patent box rules is precisely that of engaging in tax
competition with peer countries.").
159 Lewis J. Greenwald, Lucas Giardelli & Christopher Odell, The Innovation Promo-
tion Act of 2015: Not the New Ireland, 81 Tax Notes Int'l 439 (Feb. 1, 2016) (Belgium,
Cyprus, Luxembourg: 80% deduction or exemption; United Kingdom: 10% tax rate; the
Netherlands: 5% tax rate; Malta: full exemption; France: 15% tax rate; Hungary: 50%
deduction from royalties from related parties; Spain: 60% exemption; Italy: 50%
exemption).
160 See Alstadsaeter, et al., note 158, at 24-25 (patent boxes attract patents but do not
increase local innovative activity; substance requirements may mitigate adverse revenue
effects).
161 See OECD, Countering Harmful Tax Practices More Effectively, Taking into Ac-
count Transparency and Substance, Action 5-Final Report 24-37 (2015), http://www.keep
eek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/taxation/countering-harmful-tax-practices-more-
effectively-taking-into-account-transparency-and-substance-action-5-2015-final-report -978
9264241190-en#pagel; Lillian V. Faulhaber, The Luxembourg Effect: Patent Boxes and
the Limits of International Cooperation 17-25 (June 2016), papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractjid=2802281.
162 See H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 114th Cong., Innovation Promotion Act of 2015
Discussion Draft (2015), http://waysandmeans.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/In-
novation-Box-2015-Bill-Text.pdf [hereinafter IPA 2015].
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year.163 Innovation box profits would start with "qualified gross re-
ceipts," which are those derived from "qualified property." "Quali-
fied property" would be defined to mean any patent, invention,
formula, process, design, pattern, or know-how, as well as any product
made using those items; motion picture film or video; and computer
software. 164 The qualified gross receipts would be reduced by prop-
erly allocable expenses. 165 To determine the qualifying profit, the ten-
tative profit would be multiplied by the ratio of five-year R&D
expenditures performed in the United States to five-year total costs of
the taxpayer (exclusive of cost of goods sold, interest, and taxes).166
The proposal would in effect be consistent with the BEPS Action
5167 nexus requirements because the benefit effectively would be mea-
sured by R&D performed by the taxpayer in the United States. In an
effort to attract R&D back to the United States, IPA 2015 would al-
low a tax-free distribution by a CFC of intangible property if certain
conditions are satisfied. 168
The proposal has been criticized, in part on the ground that the ra-
tio used penalizes businesses that have high below-the-line expenses,
such as selling, and general and administrative expenses, including
marketing expenses.169 In addition, the rate reduction is characterized
as "hardly newsworthy. '170
Our criticisms come from a different perspective. As observed by
others, the proposal would be less effective at inducing new R&D
than an input incentive, and would be a windfall for pre-existing
R&D. 171 The proposal's design would not actually target returns to
R&D, except on a formulary basis, and would not provide benefits to
failed R&D or R&D that is not commercialized, which, as discussed
above, may also create positive spillovers. 172 For these reasons, we
conclude that the proposed innovation box is a poorly targeted rate
reduction that should not be enacted into law.




167 OECD, note 162.
168 See IPA 2015, note 162, at § 3(a).
169 See Greenwald et al., note 159, at 442.
170 Id.
171 See Martin A. Sullivan, Economic Analysis: Patent Boxes, Research Credits, or
Lower Rates?, 147 Tax Notes 975, 975 (June 1, 2015) (innovation box provides windfall
benefit to prior successful research that provides no incentive for new effort); White
House, note 6, at 22; Int'l Monetary Fund, note 1, at 52-53 (IP box can discriminate against
innovations not protected by IP, may induce applications for IP rights, and provide relief
without regard to level of R&D expenditure).
172 See Martin A. Sullivan, A History Lesson for a Future Patent Box, 148 Tax Notes
1036, 1037-38 (Sept. 7, 2015); European Commission, note 110, at 45-46.
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IV. A FRAMEWORK FOR R&D TAX EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS
A. Elements of a Framework for R&D Tax Incentives
In our view, tax expenditures with the greatest potential for revenue
savings through their elimination and the least connection to their as-
serted objectives should be given a higher priority for review. In ex-
amining tax expenditures, it is important to apply the same analytical
scrutiny and principles to "sacred cow" tax expenditures, including the
R&D tax expenditures, as well as to more controversial ones.
Consistent with our prior work examining other tax expenditures,
several elements should be a part of a nuanced framework for examin-
ing R&D tax incentives, including the following:
" Is the provision a tax expenditure? 173
* Does the subsidy address a market failure and does it target ef-
fectively the market failure? 174
" Is the provision cost effective in achieving its target?
" Are there direct expenditure or regulatory alternatives to tax in-
centives that would be more effective in achieving the target?
" Would design changes improve the cost effectiveness of the tax
incentive?
Our reading of the R&D literature is that there is uncertain empiri-
cal support for a conclusion that R&D incentives for private sector
development R&D are cost effective in the sense of increasing social
welfare and economic growth when compared with alternative public
uses of funds. If this reading is correct, and even if it is not, but it
becomes fiscally necessary to reduce R&D tax incentives, our pro-
posed framework for analysis readily points to a number of proposals
for further investigation and analysis.
B. Proposals for Further Analysis
Our tentative conclusion is that R&D tax incentives are not well
targeted, in large part because we lack a clear understanding of the
extent to which private R&D would not be conducted absent govern-
ment intervention produces welfare benefits. We do not know and are
not likely to be able to estimate with accuracy the size of the differen-
tial between the private and social benefits from private R&D invest-
173 David Hasen has suggested to us that use of the tax expenditure concept here may be
considered a proxy for a market distorting provision.
174 See Willem Bongaerts & Ivo IJzerman, The Secrets to Success of the Dutch Innova-
tion Box, 82 Tax Notes Int'l 479 (2016) (summarizing a Dutch government report finding
that 1 Euro of revenue lost by the Dutch patent box yields 0.54 Euros of R&D
expenditure).
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ment and whether the social benefits from intervention would exceed
the welfare costs. In this circumstance, we do not believe that the case
for R&D tax expenditures has been adequately proven.
Accordingly, we believe that an objective analysis of alternatives is
overdue. We are particularly skeptical of open-ended tax benefits for
private R&D. We believe that resources should be directed to basic
R&D, which may be more effectively directed through and performed
by government, university, and other nonprofit research entities, and
that outcomes should be made public and not appropriated for private
gain. We favor an instrument, such as a government grant process
using external blind peer reviews of proposals, to allocate resources
rather than a tax incentive. Accordingly, we would first pursue analy-
sis of the effects of the Group 1 proposals below.
If it is politically necessary to continue to use tax incentives to en-
courage innovation or there is strong empirical support for using such
incentives, we would rely on input incentives only. Moreover, we
would favor adoption of the Group 2 proposals below to constrain
costs and better target incentives to R&D likely to enhance U.S.
welfare.
Group 1 - Alternatives to R&D Tax Incentives
" Repeal R&D tax incentives
" Shift revenue savings to direct expenditures for peer-reviewed
R&D proposals oriented toward basic R&D and risky develop-
ment R&D
Group 2 - Capitalization
" Capitalize (that is, deny the § 174 deduction for) all R&D (as in
the Baucus and Camp tax reform proposals,175 including foreign
R&D)
• Eliminate the § 59(e) ten-year capitalization rule
* Use credits instead of deductions for incentive purposes and con-
sider credit refundability for new (that is, less than 5 years old)
small- and medium-sized businesses
• Restrict scope of R&D tax incentives (that is, tax expenditures)
to NSF or Frascati definitions of experimental R&D.
175 H.R. 1, note 148, § 3108 (providing for five-year amortization of domestic § 174 ex-
penditures and fifteen-year amortization of foreign R&D expenditures); S. Fin. Comm.,
Majority Staff, Chairman's Staff Discussion Draft, § 22 (2013), http://www.finance.senate
.gov/imo/media/doc/Chairman's%20Staff%2ODiscussion%20Draft%20on%2OCost%2ORe
covery%20and%2OAccounting%20Language.pdf (providing for five-year amortization of
§ 174 expenditures).
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* Restrict R&D tax incentives to domestic-performed R&D.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The United States should develop its tax and nontax R&D and in-
novation strategies on an integrated basis. Tax law incentives should
be re-examined without preconceptions (along with reforms to IP law)
to reduce costs and inefficiencies. Moreover, support should be given
to developing metrics for evaluating the comparative impact of R&D
tax incentives and direct R&D expenditures. Irrespective of one's
views regarding the size and role of government, government inter-
ventions through tax incentives and regulatory action should receive
the same scrutiny as direct government expenditures.
Our analysis suggests that applying a simple and straightforward
framework that employs traditional tax policy analysis leads to a con-
clusion that reforms to existing R&D tax incentives would increase
their efficiency and effectiveness. The proposals described in the pre-
ceding Part merit serious analysis and consideration.








Expensing of research and experimentation
expenditures 73,410
Credit for increasing research activities 20,630
Deferral of tax on income from CFCs 852,580
Joint Committee Tax Expenditures
FY 2015-2019
($ billions)
Therapeutic research credit 0.8
Credit for orphan drug research 5.3
credit for research and experimentation expenses*
Deferral of tax on active income of controlled
foreign corporations 563.6
Apportionment of research and development
expenses for determination of foreign tax
credits 1.1
* At the time of the report, the R&D credit was set to
expire and had not yet been made permanent.
Joint Committee Revenue Estimate
FY 2016-2025
($ millions)
Research credit permanently extended and
modified 113,245
176 Off. Mgmt. & Budget, note 53, at 243-44 tbl.14-1; Joint Comm., note 52, at 28-29, 38
tbl.1; Joint Comm., note 5, at 2.
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